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Abstract
We propose a retrieval-augmented convolutional
network and propose to train it with local mixup,
a novel variant of the recently proposed mixup
algorithm. The proposed hybrid architecture com-
bining a convolutional network and an off-the-
shelf retrieval engine was designed to mitigate the
adverse effect of off-manifold adversarial exam-
ples, while the proposed local mixup addresses
on-manifold ones by explicitly encouraging the
classifier to locally behave linearly on the data
manifold. Our evaluation of the proposed ap-
proach against five readily-available adversarial
attacks on three datasets–CIFAR-10, SVHN and
ImageNet– demonstrate the improved robustness
compared to the vanilla convolutional network.
1. Introduction
Since the initial investigation by Szegedy et al. (2013), ad-
versarial examples have drawn a large interest. Various
methods for both generating adversarial examples as well as
protecting a classifier from them have been proposed (see
Sec. 3–4 for more details.) Adversarial examples exist due
to misbehaviors of a classifier in some regions of the input
space and are generated often by finding a point in such a
region using optimization.
According to (Gilmer et al., 2018), adversarial examples
can be categorized into those off the data manifold, which
is defined as a manifold on which training examples lie,
and those on the data manifold. Off-manifold adversarial
examples occur as the classifier does not have a chance to
observe any off-manifold examples during training, which
is a natural consequence from the very definition of the data
manifold. On-manifold adversarial examples however exist
between training examples on the data manifold. There
are two causes behind this phenomenon; (1) the sparsity of
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training examples and (2) the non-smooth behavior of the
classifier on the data manifold.
In this paper, we propose to tackle both off- and on-manifold
adversarial examples by incorporating an off-the-shelf re-
trieval mechanism which indexes a large set of examples and
training this combination of a deep neural network classifier
and the retrieval engine to behave linearly on the data mani-
fold using a novel variant of the recently proposed mixup
algorithm (Zhang et al., 2017), to which we refer as “local
mixup.”
The retrieval mechanism efficiently selects a subset of neigh-
boring examples from a candidate set near the input. These
neighboring examples are used as a local approximation to
the data manifold in the form of a feature-space convex hull
onto which the input is projected. The classifier then makes
a decision based on this projected input. This addresses off-
manifold adversarial examples. Within this feature-space
convex hull, we encourage the classifier to behave linearly
by using local mixup to further address on-manifold adver-
sarial examples.
We evaluate the proposed approach, called a retrieval-
augmented classifier, with a deep convolutional network (Le-
Cun et al., 1998) on object recognition. We extensively test
the retrieval-augmented convolutional network (RaCNN)
on datasets with varying scales; CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky &
Hinton, 2009), SVHN (Netzer et al., 2011) as well as Ima-
geNet (Deng et al., 2009), against five readily-available ad-
versarial attacks including both white-box (FGSM, iFGSM,
DeepFool and L-BFGS) and black-box attacks (Boundary).
Our experiments reveal that the RaCNN is more robust to
these five attacks than the vanilla convolutional network.
2. Retrieval-Augmented CNN
Gilmer et al. (2018) have recently demonstrated that ad-
versarial examples exist both on and off the data manifold
in a carefully controlled setting in which examples from
two classes are placed on two disjoint spheres. This result
suggests that it is necessary to tackle both types of adver-
sarial examples to improve the robustness of a deep neural
network based classifier to adversarial examples. In this
section, we describe our approach toward building a more
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robust classifier by combining an off-the-shelf retrieval en-
gine and a variant of the recently proposed mix-up learning
strategy.
2.1. Setup
Let D′ = {(x′1, y′1), . . . , (x′M , y′M )} be a candidate set of
examples. This set may be created as a subset from a train-
ing set D = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xN , yN )} or may be an entire
separate set. We use D′ as a proxy to the underlying data
manifold.
k(x, x′) is a distance function that measures the dissimilarity
between two inputs x and x′. In order to facilitate the use
of an off-the-shelf retrieval engine, we use
k(x, x′) = ‖φ′(x)− φ′(x′)‖2, (1)
where φ′ is a predefined, or pretrained, feature extractor. We
assume the existence of a readily-available retrieval engine
F that takes x as input and returns the K nearest neighbors
in D′ according to k(x, x′).
We then have a deep neural network classifier composed of
a feature extraction φ and a classifier g. This classifier is
trained on a training set D, taking into account the extra set
D′ and the retrieval engine.
2.2. Inference
In this setup, we first describe the forward evaluation of the
proposed network. This forward pass is designed to handle
adversarial examples “off” the data manifold by projecting
them onto the data manifold.
Local Characterization of Data Manifold Given a new
input x, we use the retrieval engine F to retrieve the
examples x′k’s from D
′ that are closest to x: F (x) =
{x′1, . . . , x′K}. We then build a feature-space convex hull
by
C(F (x)) =
{
K∑
k=1
αkφ(x
′
k)
∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
k=1
αk = 1 ∧ ∀k : αk ≥ 0
}
.
As observed earlier, linear interpolation of two input vec-
tors in the feature space of a deep neural network often
corresponds to a plausible input vector, unlike when inter-
polation was done in the raw input space (see, e.g., Bengio
et al., 2013; Kingma & Welling, 2013; Radford et al., 2015).
Based on this observation, we consider the feature-space
convex hull C(F (x)) as a reasonable local approximation to
the underlying data manifold.
Trainable Projection Exact projection of the input x onto
this convex hull C(F (x)) requires expensive optimization,
especially in the high-dimensional space. As we consider a
deep neural network classifier, the dimension of the feature
space φ′ could be hundreds or more, making this exact
projection computationally infeasible. Instead, we propose
to learn a goal-driven projection procedure based on the
attention mechanism (Bahdanau et al., 2014).
We compare each input x′k ∈ F (x) against x and compute
a score:
βk = φ(x
′
k)
>Uφ(x),
where U is a trainable weight matrix (Luong et al., 2015).
These scores are then normalized to form a set of coef-
ficients: αk =
exp(βk)∑K
k′=1 exp(βk′ )
. These coefficients αk’s are
then used to form a projection point of x in the feature-space
convex hull C(F (x)):
P(x) = PC(F (x))(x) =
K∑
k=1
αkφ(x
′
k).
This trainable projection could be thought of as learn-
ing to project an off-manifold example on the locally-
approximated manifold to maximize the classification accu-
racy.
Classification The projected feature PC(F (x))(x) now
represents the original input x and is fed to a final clas-
sifier g. In other words, we constrain the final classifier to
work only with a point inside a feature-space convex hull
of neighboring training examples. This constraint alleviates
the issue of the classifier’s misbehavior in the region outside
the data manifold up to a certain degree.1
2.3. Training
The output of the classifier g(P(x)) is almost fully differ-
entiable with respect to the classifier g, both of the features
extractors (φ′ and φ) and the attention weight matrix U ,
except for the retrieval engine F .2 This allows us to train
the entire pipeline in the previous section using backpropa-
gation (Rumelhart et al., 1986) and gradient-based optimiza-
tion.
Local Mixup This is however not enough to ensure the
robustness of the proposed approach to on-manifold ad-
versarial examples. During training, the classifier g only
observes a very small subset of any feature-space convex
hull. Especially in a high-dimensional space, this greatly
increase the chance of the classifier’s misbehavior within
these feature-space convex hulls, as also noted by Gilmer
1 The quality of the local approximation may not be uniformly
high across the input space, and we do not claim that it solves the
problem of off-manifold adversarial examples.
2 We believe the introduction of this non-differentiable, black-
box retrieval engine further contributes to the increased robustness
against white-box attacks.
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et al. (2018). In order to address this issue, we propose
to augment learning with a local variant of the recently
proposed mix-up algorithm (Zhang et al., 2017).
The goal of original mixup is to encourage a classifier to
act linearly between any pair of training examples. This is
done by linearly mixing in two randomly-drawn training
examples and creating a new linearly-interpolated exam-
ple pair during training. Let two randomly-drawn pairs
be (xi, yi) and (xj , yj), where yi and yj are one-hot vec-
tors in the case of classification. Mixup creates a new pair
(λxi+(1−λ)xj , λyi+(1−λ)yj) and uses it as a training
example, where λ ∈ [0, 1] is a random sample from a beta
distribution. We call this original version global mixup, as
it increases the linearity of the classifier between any pair
of training examples.
It is however unnecessary for our purpose to use global
mixup, as our goal is to make the classifier better be-
have (i.e., linearly behave) within a feature-space con-
vex hull C(F (x)). Thus, we use a local mixup in
which we uniformly sample the convex coefficients
αk’s at random to create a new mixed example pair
(
∑K
k=1 αkφ(x
′
k),
∑K
k=1 αky
′
k). We use the Kraemer Al-
gorithm (see Sec. 4.2 in Smith & Tromble, 2004).
Overall We use stochastic gradient descent (SGD) to train
the proposed network. At each update, we perform NCE
descent steps for the usual classification loss, and NMU
descent steps for the proposed local mixup.
2.4. Retrieval Engine F
The proposed approach does not depend on the specifics
of a retrieval engine F . Any off-the-shelf retrieval engine
that supports dense vector lookup could be used, enabling
the use of a very large-scale D′ with latest fast dense vector
lookup algorithms, such as FAISS (Johnson et al., 2017).
In this work, we used a more rudimentary retrieval engine
based on locality-sensitive hashing (LSH; see, e.g., Datar
et al., 2004) with a reduced feature dimension using ran-
dom projection (see, e.g., Bingham & Mannila, 2001, and
references therein), as the sizes of candidate sets D′ in the
experiments contain approximately 1M or less examples.
The key φ′(x) from Eq. (1) was chosen to be a pretrained
deep neural network without the final fully-connected clas-
sifier layers (Krizhevsky et al., 2012; He et al., 2016).
3. Adversarial Attack
3.1. Attack Scenarios
Scenario 1 (Direct Attack) In this work, we consider the
candidate set D′ and the retrieval engine which indexes it to
be “hidden” from the outside world. This property makes a
usual white-box attack more of a gray-box attack in which
the attacker has access to the entire system except for the
retrieval part. This is our first attack scenario.
Scenario 2 (Retrieval Attack) Despite the hidden nature
of the retrieval engine and the candidate set, it is possible for
the attacker to confuse the retrieval engine, if she/he could
access the feature extractor φ′. We furthermore give the
attacker the access not only to φ′ but the original classifier g′
which was tuned together with φ′. This allows the attacker
to create an adversarial example on g′(φ′(x)) that could
potentially disrupt the retrieval process, thereby fooling the
proposed network. Although this is unlikely in practice,
we test this second scenario to investigate the possibility of
compromising the retrieval engine.
3.2. Attack Methods
Under each of these scenarios, we evaluate the robustness of
the proposed approach on the five widely used/tested adver-
sarial attack algorithms including both white-box and black-
box attacks. They are fast gradient sign method (FGSM,
Goodfellow et al., 2014b), its iterative variant (iFGSM,
Kurakin et al., 2016), DeepFool (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.,
2016), L-BFGS (Tabacof & Valle, 2016) and Bound-
ary (Brendel et al., 2017). We acknowledge that this is
not an exhaustive list of attacks, however find it to be ex-
tensive enough to empirically evaluate the robustness of the
proposed approach.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) FGSM creates an
adversarial example by adding the scaled sign of the gradient
of the loss function L computed using a target class yˆ to the
input:
x′ = x+  · sign(∇xL(x, yˆ)),
where the scale  controls the difference between the original
input x and its adversarial version x′. This is a white-box
attack, requiring the availability of the gradient of the loss
function with respect to the input.
Iterative FGSM (iFGSM) iFGSM improves upon the
FGSM by iteratively modifying the original input x for
a fixed number S of steps. At each step,
x(s) = x(s−1) +

S
sign(∇xL(x(s−1), y)),
where s = 1, . . . , S and x0 = x. Similarly to the FGSM,
the iFGSM is a white-box attack.
DeepFool Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2016) proposed to
create an adversarial example by finding a residual vector
r ∈ Rdim(x) with the minimum Lp-norm with the constraint
that the output of a classifier must flip. They presented an
efficient iterative procedure to find such a residual vector.
Similarly to the FGSM and iFGSM, this approach relies
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on the gradient of the classifier’s output with respect to the
input, and is hence a white-box attack.
L-BFGS Tabacof & Valle (2016) proposed an
optimization-based approach, similar to DeepFool
above, however, more explicitly constraining the input to lie
inside a tight box defined by training examples. They use
L-BFGS-B (Zhu et al., 1997) to solve this box-constrained
optimization problem. This is also a white-box attack.
Boundary Brendel et al. (2017) proposed a powerful
black-box attack, or more specifically decision-based at-
tack, that requires neither the gradient of a classifier nor
the predictive distribution. It only requires the final deci-
sion of the classifier. Starting from an adversarial example,
potentially far away from the original input, it iteratively
searches for a next adversarial example that has a smaller
difference to the original input. This procedure guarantees
the reduction in the difference by rejecting any step that
neither decreases the difference nor makes the example not
adversarial.
Implementation We use Foolbox3 released by Rauber
et al. (2017). Whenever necessary for further analysis, such
as the accuracy per the amount of adversarial perturbation,
we implement some of these attacks ourselves.
4. Related Work
Since the phenomenon of adversarial examples was noticed
by Szegedy et al. (2013), there have been a stream of at-
tempts at making a deep neural network more robust. Most
of the existing work are orthogonal to the proposed approach
here and could be used together. We however detail them
here to demonstrate similarities and contrasts against our
approach.
4.1. Input Transformation
An off-manifold adversarial example can be avoided, if it
could be projected onto the data manifold, characterized by
training examples. This could be thought of as transforming
an input. There have been two families of algorithms in this
direction.
Data-Independent Transformation The first family of
defense mechanisms aims at reducing the input space so as
to minimize regions that are off the data manifold. Dziugaite
et al. (2016) demonstrated that JPEG-compressed images
suffer less from adversarial attacks. Lu et al. (2017) suggest
that trying various scaling of an image size could overcome
adversarial attacks, as they seem to be sensitive to the scal-
3 Available at http://foolbox.readthedocs.io/
en/latest/. Revision 2d468cb6.
ing of objects. Guo et al. (2017) uses an idea of compressed
sensing to transform an input image by reconstructing it
from its lower-resolution version while minimizing the total
variation (Rudin et al., 1992). More recently, Jacob Buck-
man (2018) proposed to discretize each input dimension
using thermometer coding. These approaches are attractive
due to their simplicity, but there have some work showing
that it is often not enough to defend against sophisticated
adversarial examples (see, e.g., Shin & Song, 2017).
Data-Dependent Transformation On the other hand,
various groups have tried using a data-dependent transfor-
mation mostly relying on density estimation. Gu & Rigazio
(2014) used a denoising autoencoder (Vincent et al., 2010) to
push an input back toward the data manifold. Pouya Saman-
gouei (2018) and Song et al. (2017) respectively use a pixel-
CNN (van den Oord et al., 2016) and generative adversarial
network (Goodfellow et al., 2014a) to replace an input image
with a nearby, likely image. Instead of using a separately
trained generative model, Guo et al. (2017) uses a tech-
nique of image quilting (Efros & Freeman, 2001). These
approaches are similar to our use of a retrieval engine over
the candidate set. They however do not attempt at address-
ing the issue of misbehaviors of a classifier on the data
manifold.
4.2. Attack-Aware Learning
Another direction has been on modifying a learning algo-
rithm to make a classifier more robust to adversarial exam-
ples. As our approach relies on usual backpropagation with
stochastic gradient descent, most of the approaches below,
as well as above, are readily used together.
Adversarial Training Already early on, Goodfellow et al.
(2014b) proposed a procedure of adversarial training, where
a classifier is trained on both training examples and ad-
versarial examples generated on-the-fly. Lee et al. (2017)
extended this procedure by introducing a generative adver-
sarial network (GAN, Goodfellow et al., 2014a) that learns
to generate adversarial examples while simultaneously train-
ing a classifier. These approaches are generally applicable
to any system that could be tuned frequently, and could be
used to train the proposed model.
Robust Optimization Instead of explicitly including ad-
versarial examples during training, there have been attempts
to modify a learning algorithm to induce robustness. Cisse
et al. (2017) proposed parseval training that encourages the
Lipschitz constant of each layer of a deep neural network
classifier to be less than one. More recently, Aman Sinha
(2018) proposed a tractable robust optimization algorithm
for training a deep neural net classifier to be more robust to
adversarial examples. This robust optimization algorithm
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Table 1. The CIFAR-10 classifiers’ robustness to the adversarial attacks in the Scenario 2 (Retrieval Attack)
Clean FGSM iFGSM DeepFool
L2 0 1e-04 2e-04 4e-04 1e-05 2e-05 8e-05 1e-05 2e-05 8e-05
Baseline 85.15 14.05 7.5 4.22 55.2 26.17 2.59 26.04 11.72 0.34
RaCNN-K5 72.57 42.97 34.29 24.55 72.57 72.48 45.46 64.34 61.34 60.96
RaCNN-K5-mixup 75.6 46.37 37.9 28.11 74.89 74.89 48.12 66.96 63.84 63.55
RaCNN-K10 79.52 52.95 43.9 33.77 79.12 79 55.27 72.89 71.81 71.14
RaCNN-K10-mixup 80.80 53 44.01 33.47 79.87 79.72 54.36 73.63 72.35 71.26
ensures that the classifier well-behaves in the neighborhood
of each training point. It is highly relevant to the proposed
local mixup which also aims at making a classifier well-
behave between any pair of neighboring training examples.
4.3. Retrieval-Augmented Neural Networks
The proposed approach tightly integrates an off-the-shelf
retrieval engine into a deep neural network. This approach
of retrieval-augmented deep learning has recently been pro-
posed in various tasks. Gu et al. (2017) use a text-based
retrieval engine to efficiently retrieve relevant training trans-
lation pairs and let their non-parametric neural machine
translation system seamlessly fuse an input sentence and
the retrieved pairs for better translation. Wang et al. (2017)
proposed a similar approach to text classification, and Guu
et al. (2017) to language modeling. More recently, Sprech-
mann et al. (2018) applied this retrieval-based mechanism
for online learning, similarly to the earlier work by Li et al.
(2016) in the context of machine translation.
5. Experiments
5.1. Settings
Datasets We test the proposed approach (RaCNN) on
three datasets of different scales. CIFAR-10 has 50k train-
ing and 10k test examples, with 10 classes. SVHN has 73k
training and 26k test examples, with 10 classes. ImageNet
has 1.3M training and 50k validation examples with 1,000
classes. For CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, we use the original
training set as a candidate set, i.e., D′ = D, while we use
the extra set of 531k examples as a candidate set in the
case of SVHN. The overall training process involves data
augmentation on D but not D′.
Pretrained Feature Extractor φ′ We train a deep con-
volutional network for each dataset, remove the final fully-
connected layers and use the remaining stack as a feature
extractor φ for retrieval. This feature extractor is fixed when
used in the proposed RaCNN.
RaCNN: Feature Extractor φ and Classifier g We use
the same convolutional network from above for the RaCNN
FGSM iFGSM
DeepFool L-BFGS
Boundary
Figure 1. The CIFAR-10 classi-
fiers’ robustness to the adversar-
ial attacks in the Scenario 1 (Di-
rect Attack). The x-axis indi-
cates the strength of attack in
terms of the normalized L2 dis-
tance. The y-axis corresponds
to the accuracy.
as well (separated into φ and g by the final average pooling)
for each dataset. For CIFAR-10 and SVHN, we train φ and
g from scratch. For ImageNet, on the other hand, we fix φ =
φ′ and train g from the pretrained ResNet-18 above. The
latter was done, as we observed it greatly reduced training
time in the preliminary experiments.
Training We use Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2014) as an op-
timizer. We investigate the influence of the newly intro-
duced components–retrieval and local mixup– by varying
K ∈ {5, 10} and NMU ∈ {0 (no mixup), 5}.
Evaluation In addition to the accuracy on the clean test
set, we look at the accuracy per the amount of perturbation
used to create adversarial examples. We use the default
MeanSquaredDistance from the Foolbox library; this
amount is computed as a normalized L2 distance between
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Table 2. The SVHN classifiers’ robustness to the adversarial attacks in the Scenario 2 (Retrieval Attack)
Clean FGSM iFGSM DeepFool
L2 0 2e-04 4e-04 8e-04 2e-05 8e-05 2e-04 2e-05 8e-05 2e-04
Baseline 95.48 42.09 30.95 21.61 70.41 35.53 11.17 51.10 16.00 4.28
RaCNN-K5 90.78 64.87 53.31 39.44 90.73 75.80 63.41 84.62 81.30 80.55
RaCNN-K5-mixup 91.64 68.31 57.20 43.73 91.55 77.74 65.75 86.18 83.20 82.43
RaCNN-K10 92.19 64.94 52.24 37.73 92.10 76.41 62.70 86.18 84.25 82.21
RaCNN-K10-mixup 92.49 68.72 57.30 43.49 92.45 78.26 65.50 87.33 84.73 84.10
the original example x and its perturbed version x˜:
L2(x, x˜) =
‖x− x˜‖22
dim(x) ∗ (max(x)−min(x))2 .
We further notice that our attacks are generally performed
with clipping the outbounded pixel values at each step.
5.2. CIFAR-10
Model In the CIFAR-10 experiments, our model contains
6 convolutional layers followed by 2 fully-connected layers.
Every layer is operated with batch normalization (Ioffe &
Szegedy, 2015) and ReLU after. More details can be found
in Appendix 7.
Scenario 1 (Direct Attack) We present in Fig. 1 the ef-
fect of adversarial attacks with varying strengths (measured
in the normalized L2 distance) on both the vanilla convolu-
tional network (Baseline) and the proposed RaCNN’s with
various settings. Across all five adversarial attacks, it is
clear that the proposed RaCNN is more robust to adversarial
examples than the vanilla classifier is. The proposed local
mixup improves the robustness further, especially when the
number of retrieved examples is small, i.e., K = 5. We
conjecture that this is due to the quadratically increasing
number of pairs, i.e., K(K−1)2 , for which local mixup must
take care of, with respect to K.
Scenario 2 (Retrieval Attack) In Table 1, we present the
accuracies of both the baseline and RaCNN’s with varying
strengths of white-box attacks, when the feature extractor
φ′ for the retrieval engine is attacked. We observe that it is
indeed possible to fool the proposed RaCNN by attacking
the retrieval process. Comparing Fig. 1 and Table 1, we
however notice that the performance degradation is much
less severe in this second scenario.
5.3. SVHN
Model We use the same architecture and hyper-parameter
setting as in the CIFAR-10 experiments.
Scenario 1 (Direct Attack) On SVHN, we observe a sim-
ilar trend from CIFAR-10. The proposed RaCNN is more
FGSM iFGSM
DeepFool L-BFGS
Boundary
Figure 2. The SVHN classifiers’
robustness to the adversarial at-
tacks in the Scenario 1 (Direct
Attack). The x-axis indicates
the strength of attack in terms
of the normalized L2 distance.
The y-axis corresponds to the
accuracy.
robust against all the adversarial attacks compared to the
vanilla convolutional network. Similarly to CIFAR-10, the
proposed approach is most robust to DeepFool and Bound-
ary, while it is most susceptible to L-BFGS. We however
notice that the impact of local mixup is larger with SVHN
than was with CIFAR-10.
Another noticeable difference is the impact of the number of
retrieved examples on the classification accuracy. In the case
of CIFAR-10, the accuracies on the clean test examples (the
first column in Table 1) between using 5 and 10 retrieved
examples differ significantly, while it is much less so with
SVHN (the first column in Table 2.) We conjecture that
this is due to a lower level of variation in input examples
in SVHN, which are pictures of house numbers taken from
streets, compared to those in CIFAR-10, which are pictures
of general objects.
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Table 3. The ImageNet classifiers’ robustness to the adversarial attacks in the Scenario 2 (Retrieval Attack).
Clean FGSM iFGSM DeepFool
L2 0 1e-04 2e-04 4e-04 1e-05 2e-05 4e-05 1e-05 2e-05 4e-05
Baseline 88.98 15 13.12 11.65 9.59 3.57 1.82 0.29 0.17 0.16
RaCNN-K10-mixup 77.68 20.17 17.40 14.70 77.28 64.97 17.67 35.74 35.72 35.71
FGSM iFGSM
DeepFool L-BFGS
Boundary
Figure 3. The ImageNet classi-
fiers’ robustness to the adversar-
ial attacks in the Scenario 1 (Di-
rect Attack). The x-axis indi-
cates the strength of attack in
terms of the normalized L2 dis-
tance. The y-axis corresponds
to the accuracy. The adversary
utilizes top-5 accuracies for at-
tacks.
Scenario 2 (Retrieval Attack) We observe a similar
trend between CIFAR-10 and SVHN, when the feature ex-
tractor φ′ for retrieval was attacked, as shown in Tables 1–2.
5.4. ImageNet
Model We use ResNet-18 (He et al., 2016). We pretrain
it as a standalone classifier on ImageNet and use the feature
extractor part φ′ for retrieval. We use the same feature
extractor φ = φ′ for the RaCNN without updating it. The
classifier g is initialized with g′ and tuned during training.
In the case of ImageNet, we only try K = 10 retrieved
examples with local mixup. Due to the high computational
cost of the L-BFGS and Boundary attacks, we evaluate
both the vanilla classifier and RaCNN against these two
attacks on 200 images drawn uniformly at random from the
validation set. We use Accuracy@5 which is a standard
metric with ImageNet.
Scenario 1 (Direct Attack) A general trend with Ima-
geNet is similar to that with either CIFAR-10 or SVHN, as
can be seen in Fig. 3. The proposed RaCNN is more robust
to adversarial attacks. We however do observe some dif-
ferences. First, iFGSM is better at compromising both the
baseline and RaCNN than L-BFGS is, in this case. Second,
DeepFool is much more successful at fooling the baseline
convolutional network on ImageNet than on the other two
datasets, but is much less so at fooling the proposed RaCNN.
Scenario 2 (Retrieval Attack) Unlike CIFAR-10 and
SVHN, we have observed that the retrieval attack is some-
times more effective than the direct attack in the case of
ImageNet. For instance, FGSM can compromise the re-
trieval feature extractor φ′ to decrease the accuracy from
77.68 down to 0.20 at L2 = 10−4. We observed a similar
behavior with DeepFool, but not with iFGSM.
5.5. Discussion
In summary, we have observed that the proposed RaCNN,
when trained with the local mixup, is more robust to ad-
versarial attacks, at least those five considered in the ex-
periments, than the vanilla convolutional network. More
specifically, the RaCNN was most robust to the black-box,
decision-based attach (Brendel et al., 2017), while it was
more easily compromised by white-box attacks, especially
by the L-BFGS attack (Tabacof & Valle, 2016) which relies
on a strong, quasi-Newton optimizer. This suggests that
the RaCNN could be an attractive alternative to the vanilla
convolutional network when deployed, for instance, in a
cloud-based environment.
In Fig. 4, we show retrieval results given a query image from
ImageNet. Although adversarial attack did indeed alter the
retrieval engine’s behavior, we see that the semantics of
the original query image could still be maintained in those
sets of retrieved images, suggesting two insights. First, the
robustness of the RaCNN is largely due to the robustness
of the retrieval engine to small perturbation in the input.
Even when the retrieval quality degrades, we observe that a
majority of retrieved examples are of the same, or a similar,
class. Second, we could further improve the robustness by
designing the feature extractor φ′ for the retrieval engine
more carefully. For instance, an identity function φ′(x) =
x would correspond to retrieval based on the raw pixels,
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Clean
iFGSM (Scenario 1 – Direct Attack) with L2 = 2× 10−5
iFGSM (Scenario 2 – Retrieval Attack) with L2 = 2× 10−5
iFGSM (Scenario 1 – Direct Attack) with L2 = 4× 10−5
iFGSM (Scenario 2 – Retrieval Attack) with L2 = 4× 10−5
Figure 4. On the left-most column shows the query image, and the next ten images have been retrieved by F . We show the retrieval results
using the original image and the adversarial images one row at a time. With the amount of injected noise high enough to fool any vanilla
convolutional network, the behavior of the retrieval engine changes however largely maintains the semantics of the query image. That is,
most of the retrieved images contain fish, although specific species may change.
which would make the retrieval engine extremely robust
to any adversarial attack imperceptible to humans. This
may however results in a lower accuracy on clean examples,
which is a trade-off that needs to be determined per task.
As have been observed with the existing input transforma-
tion based defense strategies, the robustness of the proposed
RaCNN comes at the expense of the generalization perfor-
mance on clean input examples. We have observed however
that this degradation could be controlled at the expense of
computational overhead by varying the number of retrieved
examples per input. This controllability could be an impor-
tant feature when deploying such a model in production.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a novel retrieval-augmented con-
volutional network classifier (RaCNN) that integrates an off-
the-shelf retrieval engine to counter adversarial attacks. The
RaCNN was designed to tackle both off- and on-manifold
adversarial examples, and to do so, we use a retrieval engine
to locally characterize the data manifold as a feature-space
convex hull and the attention mechanism to project the in-
put onto this convex hull. The entire model, composed of
the retrieval engine and a deep convolutional network, is
trained jointly, and we introduced the local mixup learning
strategy to encourage the classifier to behave linearly on the
feature-space convex hull.
We have evaluated the proposed approach on three stan-
dard object recognition benchmarks–CIFAR-10, SVHN and
ImageNet– against four white-box adversarial attacks and
one black-box, decision-based attack. The experiments have
revealed that the proposed approach is indeed more robust
than the vanilla convolutional network in all the cases. The
RaCNN was found to be especially robust to the black-box,
decision-based attack, suggesting its potential for the cloud-
based deployment scenario.
The proposed approach consists of three major components;
(1) local characterization of data manifold, (2) data mani-
fold projection and (3) regularized learning on the manifold.
There is a large room for improvement in each of these com-
ponents. For instance, a feature-space convex hull may be
replaced with a more sophisticated kernel estimator. Projec-
tion onto the convex hull could be done better, and a learning
algorithm better than local mixup could further improve the
robustness against on-manifold adversarial examples. We
leave these possibilities as future work.
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7. Appendix: Model details
Our CIFAR-10 and SVHN model spec is listed in the fol-
lowing table.
Stage Architecture Size
Feature extractor 96 3x3 convolution 96 x 30 x 30
φ batch normalization
96 3x3 convolution 96 x 28 x 28
batch normalization & ReLU
96 3x3 convolution with stride
2x2
96 x 13 x 13
batch normalization & ReLU
192 3x3 convolution 192 x 11 x 11
batch normalization & ReLU
192 3x3 convolution with stride
2x2
192 x 4 x 4
batch normalization
Attention 256 4x4 convolution 256
Convex-sum (with attention
mechanism U or local mixup)
256
Classification fully-connected layer 256 x 64 64
batch normalization & ReLU
fully-connected layer 64 x 10 10
The pretrained retrieval index building φ′ network is listed
as follow:
Stage Architecture Size
Feature extractor 96 3x3 convolution 96 x 30 x 30
φ′ batch normalization & ReLU
96 3x3 convolution 96 x 28 x 28
batch normalization & ReLU
96 3x3 convolution with stride
2x2
96 x 13 x 13
batch normalization & ReLU
192 3x3 convolution 192 x 11 x 11
batch normalization & ReLU
192 3x3 convolution with stride
2x2
192 x 4 x 4
batch normalization
Classification fully-connected layer 3072 x 512 512
Used only batch normalization & ReLU
in Scenario 2 fully-connected layer 512 x 128 128
batch normalization & ReLU
fully-connected layer 128 x 10 10
